China is using social media platforms for intelligence gathering

The Chinese intelligence services are actively using LinkedIn and other social media platforms to recruit sources of human intelligence. People in Finland are also targets of interest for Chinese intelligence.

Social media platforms provide a cheap and effective means for the Chinese intelligence services to recruit or seek out human intelligence sources. Selecting and approaching suitable targets is easy on LinkedIn and similar platforms.

Intelligence actors using social media platforms have less risk of exposure than those engaging in face-to-face human intelligence, as they can do so without leaving their home country. Verifying the involvement of Chinese intelligence in contacts may be difficult, especially in the early stages.

Besides recruitment operations, intelligence services actively gather information from social media platforms for various purposes.

Approaches are hard to recognise

The recruitment process on LinkedIn typically begins when an intelligence officer or their agent approaches the target individual on behalf of some business enterprise. This may involve asking the target to write a report or provide consultation on some topic of interest to China, such as policymaking or cutting-edge technological expertise.

The person requesting the service will not necessarily have any evident direct connection to China. For example, they may pose as a representative of some real or fictitious recruiting or consulting agency that seems unrelated to China.

The information initially requested is often available from public sources, and some fee may also be payable for complying with the request. Targets who comply may be asked to provide more confidential details at a later time, or they may be lured into travelling to China.

Efforts will be made at some point to transfer contact to a professional intelligence officer if the target was initially approached by an agent.

Always advise Supo of suspicious approaches

Intelligence gathering and recruitment efforts through LinkedIn and similar platforms have become an established practice of the Chinese intelligence services, and it is wise to be wary of unusual and unexpected approaches. These should be reported in the first instance to the department that is responsible for security in your own organisation.

You may also contact Supo on suspecting an attempt at recruiting. This is worthwhile even if the potential recruitment process has already progressed further.

There is every prospect that the Chinese intelligence services will continue using social media platforms. They will probably seek to make these operations more sophisticated by obfuscating their links to China, perhaps by disguising them as a regular professional recruitment process, for example. Artificial intelligence will also provide new opportunities to enhance this activity.

Contacts that increasingly request sensitive information or that extend invitations to visit China may be linked to the Chinese intelligence services.