Russia seeks to influence European countries through sabotage

Several European countries have seen acts of sabotage linked to Russian intelligence over the past two years. These acts have become a form of Russian influencing in Europe. Operations have targeted major countries in Europe and a few other states.

The influencing capacity of Russia in Europe deteriorated significantly after it launched a major invasion of Ukraine in 2022. While Russia has traditionally used diplomatic cover for its intelligence operations, Western countries have expelled numerous intelligence officers from its embassies since the war began.

Russian intelligence has accordingly been forced to change its operating methods in order to adapt to these new conditions. The shift in Russia towards a war society has also become evident in its working methods outside of Ukraine.

These include more active sabotage operations that are mainly linked to the GRU Russian military intelligence service. As a branch of the Russian armed forces, the GRU is more prone to engage in direct intelligence operations than its counterpart in foreign intelligence, the civilian intelligence service (SVR). The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) mainly operates within the borders of Russia, although it also has powers and a history of operations abroad.

Sabotage has assumed more serious forms

Russia formerly tended to use its own trained intelligence officers for foreign sabotage operations, which were infrequent, but more carefully planned and aimed at strategic targets. Examples include the attempted assassination of the Skripals in the UK and the 2014 bombing of an ammunition depot in Czechia by GRU Unit 29155.

Russia currently relies for destructive operations on intermediaries, such as criminals or others motivated by financial gain. These operators may, for example, carry out arson attacks at even quite minimal cost without ever knowing the true identity of their ultimate client. Such proxies are typically recruited through social media and are not particularly professional.

The attacks are aimed at simple and readily accessible targets that are of symbolic or secondary importance in terms of actual support for Ukraine, such as shopping centres or other less well-protected sites. One potential target is military support for Ukraine, including its manufacture, transportation or storage.

Russian sabotage operations in Europe have nevertheless assumed increasingly dangerous forms that show indifference even to innocent bystander victims, as evidenced in news reports released in 2024 by the German and British authorities concerning incendiary devices in haulage parcels.

Russia seeks to engender fear

Russia is hoping that sabotage operations will influence opinions and the general sense of public safety, while imposing a burden on public authorities. The chosen targets have little strategic significance as such. Isolated acts of sabotage targeting military support would not significantly affect conditions on the front line in Ukraine.

The intended impact is more psychological. Russia is seeking to create a sense of insecurity with a view to influencing decisions in Western countries. As the GRU is behind the operation, it also has military objectives.

The main aim is to turn public opinion in the West against supporting Ukraine. Russia is also seeking to demonstrate its ability to act in the West, and to seek negotiating positions that will pay off in future. Even though the targets of these operations no longer have their former strategic significance, their impact has increased.

We may well see changes in Russian intelligence service operations in future. Russia may come up with new modes of influencing when cases of sabotage become public. It often acts opportunistically by experimenting with various approaches from which it reaps such benefits as become available.

The behaviour of Russia will also depend on shifts in relations between Russia and the West. If operating conditions for Russian intelligence in the West improve, for example, then Russia may very well once again begin to prefer more classical intelligence methods. Only in the longer term will we see whether the current sabotage operations become an established Russian way of working.

Finland is not the main target, but sabotage cannot be ruled out

Finland is probably not an especially important target for Russian operations in terms of their impact and attention value. Russia does not view Finland as a key actor that could influence policymaking on the western front.

The threat of sabotage nevertheless remains a real one that must also be taken seriously in Finland. Russia has reclassified Finland as an unfriendly country that has tightened its stance towards Russia. Supo has already included the threat of sabotage in its security assessments for some time.

The most likely targets of Russia-sponsored sabotage in Finland would also be operators that are involved in providing material support to Ukraine, such as the defense industry. Russian sabotage operations currently pose no threat to critical services.