Russia is reorienting globally

Three years of war in Ukraine have forced Russia into a significant international reorientation. Even though Russia projects confidence in its foreign policy, it is evident that its importance has declined globally.

The shift has been most dramatic in the collapse of relations between Russia and the West. The conduct of Russia has significantly reduced its influence in Western countries.

With a decline in customary channels of influence, Russian actions in Europe have grown more aggressive. The ability of the West to influence Russia has similarly waned as relations with the Russian people have grown more distant.

This repositioning significantly magnifies the risk of misunderstandings and overreaction. With an almost complete break in traditional diplomacy, discussions have increasingly shifted to the public domain. A lack of information through conventional channels increases the need for intelligence on both sides.

Russia looks to the East and the South

Russia is nevertheless not as globally isolated as might appear when viewed from the West. Its most important line of sight is now towards China. Russia has increasingly tied itself to China, and to Chinese foreign policy objectives. It is evident that China is the more powerful party in this relationship. Russia and China are seeking to strengthen international structures in which Western countries are not involved.

Russia is looking to the global South, meaning Africa, Asia and Latin America. Cooperation between the BRICS countries is one aspect of this. While seeking to explore trade projects in the global South, Russia also aims to increase its political clout, as is evident in its diplomatic and other efforts.

The global South will clearly not replace the European market that was previously a target for a large part of Russia's international trade. This is partly a matter of basic logistics: gas pipelines to new locations cannot be constructed overnight.

Russia does not have an open playing field, even in the global South. The Wagner mercenary group previously served as a channel of Russian influence in several African countries, but the Russian Ministry of Defence has now disbanded Wagner in the wake of a coup attempt in summer 2023. The rigid bureaucracy has been unable to replace the company, which operated as a more agile channel of influence. This means that Russia has become less influential in Africa.

Russia takes an aggressive posture, but would like to restore trade relations with Europe

Russian President Vladimir Putin has now been in power longer than any European leader, giving him a certain degree of confidence. With no need to consider election cycles in planning, the Russian leadership believes that a policy of attrition may be effective in many issues.

The key goal of Russian influencing is to undermine support for Ukraine. Russia may be considered to have partially succeeded in this respect, as it has been able to effect constraints on military support provided by the West. On the other hand, Western support for Ukraine has continued and become more established as the war has dragged on.

Despite conveying a rhetorical impression of confidence and aggression, Russia would like to restore trade relations with European countries. Another key objective for Russia is to see some lifting, or at least easing of sanctions.

Russia seeks to address its message in Europe to listeners who would like normalise trade relations. While support for Ukraine has been quite unanimous in Finland, attitudes are not so clear in many other European countries. Russian influencing seeks to focus on economic arguments.

The worldview of the Russian leadership does not regard all Western countries as absolutely evil, but draws a distinction between the good West and the bad West. Western leaders are cast as the bad West, which seeks to isolate Russia. By contrast, the good West is represented by ordinary people, and by those who would be willing to continue trading with Russia. Russia does not value democracy, or the fact that political leadership in European countries reflects the views of the people.

Clearly there is no going back to business as usual in trade relations between Europe and Russia from either point of view. Restoring trust in the eyes of Europeans would require a radical and unlikely change in Russia, but Russia, in turn, has no desire to become as dependent on the West again as it was before the war.

Small states not crucial for Russian influencing

Russian influencing in Europe focuses particularly on large countries, and naturally also on Ukraine. Russia is not an omnipotent influencer, but a country at war that must prioritise its actions. Small countries like Finland are not the most important influencing targets from Russia's perspective.

Russia views itself as a superpower that is primarily opposed to the USA. On the other hand, Russia also feels itself to be under threat, and to be acting reciprocally, even when escalating the situation from the perspective of the West. Its key objective is to maintain its own internal stability.

While Russia remains the greatest threat to Finland, we are not as important from the Russian perspective, which views small countries like Finland as a zone of operations that serves the interests of major powers. Russia envisages a world in which small states should become satellites of larger states that may disregard their interests when a few large countries settle matters between themselves.

At the same time, the Baltic Sea has major significance to Russia. A shadow fleet navigating the Baltic Sea is currently the most economically and logistically viable option for Russia to transport oil by sea. Using this shadow fleet to evade sanctions on crude oil is very important to the economy of the Russian Federation.

It is evident that the relationship between Russia and Finland has shifted fundamentally. Russia views Finland as an unfriendly country due to its NATO membership and other factors. It feels that Finland has betrayed its trust by becoming an ally of the USA.

Russia continues to prepare for a deepening confrontation with the West, and is striving to maintain instruments that it can resort to if necessary. It is preparing for various hostile operations against Western countries, and also against Finland. Such preparations nevertheless do not indicate that any decision has been made to take such actions immediately.