A grim security situation has given intelligence a key role in foreign and security policy
State and national security have returned to the core of political life. A gloomy era of superpower competition and confrontation between states has enlarged the role of security and intelligence services in foreign and security policy.
Proxies used by various states are playing an increasingly important role in both intelligence and broadly based influencing. Whether referring to Russia, China or Iran, state actors are seeking to cover their tracks by working through intermediaries. Such proxies enable power agencies of authoritarian countries to confuse the real state of affairs, lend plausible deniability to their actions, and foster new forms of uncertainty. Recruitment can be conducted through social media, with payment made in cryptocurrencies so that assignees need not even know who they are ultimately working for.
Russian sabotage operations in Europe are one example of the use of proxy actors. These operations have become increasingly dangerous, showing indifference to the safety of innocent bystanders. They cover a broad spectrum from highly complex cyberattacks to simple acts of destruction. Their main objective is to undermine Western support for Ukraine.
Finland has not been a target of strong Russian influencing so far. Such influencing has instead primarily targeted large EU Member States, and also countries with a substantial Russian minority or pro-Russian political parties.
The impression of Russian influencing conveyed in the media – and consequently in the public imagination – does not always reflect reality, with such incidents as ordinary domestic vandalism counted as actions taken by Russia. Russia is happy to see this, as it amplifies the deterrent effect and fosters an impression of Russian omnipotence.
Russian influencing operations continually test the West and NATO, monitoring their reactions and resilience. Russia understands the West and Finland poorly. For example, Finland's accession to NATO surprised the Russian leadership. A deteriorating understanding of the logic of Finland's actions, coupled with reluctance to convey unwelcome news to top-level leadership, may pose a risk of misjudgement leading Russia to react based on its own misinterpretations.
In an increasingly obfuscated arena, influencing also requires a growing input from the intelligence services. Supo seeks to warn the Finnish government of Russian non-military influencing in advance. Public authorities also use intelligence provided by Supo to mount an effective defence against the most serious threats, such as terrorism.
The rules of the intelligence world require extreme discretion, meaning that only like-minded services may be parties to international intelligence exchanges. This makes intelligence services invaluable tools for nation states. These doors will nevertheless be completely closed to Finland unless Supo and Finnish military intelligence are adequately resourced to assist in collaboration with foreign partners.
It is clear that Russia in particular has significantly altered our security environment, with no signs of improvement in sight. Russia is an aggressive, expansionist state that is prepared to use all means to achieve its political goals. Russia's emphasis on an imperialist character, factually unfounded historical interpretations, and a decades-long manipulation of the nation into believing in the historic mission of the country call for a capable and strong Finnish intelligence that can provide early warning of potential measures against Finland.
Juha Martelius
Director of Supo